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Abstract 
The deployment of new broadband networks (NBNs) based on fiber-optic transmission technologies promises high 
gains in terms of productivity and economic growth, and has attracted subsidies worth billions from governments 
around the world in the form of various state aid programs. Yet, the effectiveness and the efficiency of such programs 
remains largely unstudied. We employ panel data from 32 OECD countries during 2002-2019 to provide robust 
empirical evidence of both. We find that state aid significantly increases NBNs by facilitating the deployment of new 
connections to 22% of households in the short term and 39.2% in the long term. By comparing the actual amounts of 
state aid support to the estimated impact on GDP growth, we also find it to be highly cost efficient, as the programs 
break even after three years on average.  
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Similar to the societal benefits of “old” (copper or coaxial cable-based) broadband infrastructures, the future 
importance of high-speed, and hence “new” (fiber-optic transmission based), broadband networks (NBNs)2 
relates to their general-purpose technology character (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), which promises 
significant productivity improvements, product innovations, and economic growth across all major business 
sectors. For this reason, the deployment of NBNs has become a hot policy topic and governments in most 
of the developed countries have defined ambitious broadband targets in terms of desirable coverage levels. 
At supranational level, the European Commission (EC) first defined in 2010, in its Digital Agenda Europe 
(DAE) objectives for 2020, the requirement inter alia that “all Europeans have access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps” (European Commission, 2010, p. 19). The EC recently expressed more ambitious 
and long-term objectives for 2025 in its “Gigabit society strategy”, which intends to promote “gigabit-ready” 
networks requiring inter alia “[a]ll European households, rural or urban, to have access to internet 
connectivity offering a downlink of at least 100 Mbps, upgradable to gigabit speed” (European Commission, 
2016, pp. 35-36). Similar broadband plans with ubiquitous coverage targets have been implemented in most 
of the developed countries (OECD, 2018).  
Replacing existing broadband networks with fiber-optic networks requires high investment volumes. As 
private investors are not ready to roll out NBNs in remote and unprofitable regions, state aid is necessary 
to achieve ubiquitous household coverage targets in most countries. Accordingly, the DAE already 
encouraged the use of national and European Union (EU)-related funding instruments to meet the 
broadband coverage targets (European Commission, 2010). The use of state aid to foster broadband 
infrastructure already started in the mid-2000s, but it has been expanded starting with the DAE. In the last 
two decades, public authorities in individual EU and non-EU OECD member states have become more 
and more inclined to see state aid for NBNs as a necessary policy. Past and current state aid programs in 
some of the major economies in Europe (and elsewhere) add up to two-digit billions of Euros (Feasey et 
al., 2018). State aid programs have been determined predominantly at national government levels and show 
considerable variation in design and volumes in international comparison. In the EU, state aid policies are 
largely meant to directly increase coverage, and thus only indirectly increase adoption of broadband services 
by consumers. 
The actual effect of the state aid programs on the NBN rollout is both not obvious and understudied. 
According to the state aid guidelines in the EU (Feasey et al., 2018) and other developed countries (OECD, 
2018), the state aid is typically restricted to the “white” areas, meaning only the areas where the NBN 
deployment is considered unprofitable under normal market conditions. Still, it might be subject to various 
inefficiencies, even if allocation of funds is subjected to competitive tender processes. First, the extent of 
white areas is endogenously determined by chosen public targets and their specific definition of desired 
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bandwidth levels (and other quality parameters). In most cases, national or supranational targets are derived 
from a political process and not based on empirical evidence (Briglauer et al., 2020a). Second, public 
broadband targets might result in regulatory games on the side of network operators. The latter might wait 
and postpone investment in otherwise profitable areas if they expect state aid funds when politicians are 
committed to fulfil target criteria, but no ex post preemption by other operators. Third, as policymakers 
appear to have become less patient about fast deployment of NBNs, the latter exhibit many more white 
areas, which already received state aid. It appears that NBN-related funding is much more likely to be subject 
to the crowding out of private investment compared to the funding of old broadband networks, as state aid 
might be used too early for operators to address user demand for new services. Fourth, concerns are 
aggravated in view of multiple institutional funding platforms at supranational, national, and local levels 
with substantial risks of coordination failure and crowding out of private investments due to institutional 
overprovisioning of state aid (Bourreau et al., 2020). Against this background, overall efficiency properties 
and the effectiveness of state aid programs for NBN are a priori unclear. 
Despite its growing financial importance and the widespread use of state aid for NBNs in most developed 
countries, it is astonishing that their effectiveness and efficiency has hardly received academic consideration 
in terms of theoretical or empirical analysis (Bourreau et al., 2020). In this paper, we aim to provide i) an 
empirical ex post evaluation that informs policy makers about the causal effects of NBN-specific state aid 
programs in developed (OECD) countries, and ii) contrast our estimates with average public funding 
expenditures to perform a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of state aid programs. Answering the first 
research question allows us to assess the effectiveness, whereas answering the second research question 
allows us to shed some light on the overall efficiency of state aid programs.  
In our empirical investigation, we employ comprehensive panel data for OECD countries comprising 
almost the entire period of NBN deployment (2002-2019). Our data covers real NBN investment measured 
in physical units rather than less direct accounting measures. Taking various sources of endogeneity into 
account, we employ panel estimation techniques including instrumental variables with different sets of 
external and internal instruments. In our estimation strategy, we further accommodate the dynamics of the 
investment adjustment process underlying NBN deployment. The latter not only captures real-world 
characteristics with disproportionally increasing deployment costs, but also allows us to disentangle the 
effects of state aid programs on total NBN coverage and the effects on the speed of NBN deployment. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature related to 
broadband state aid policies. Section 3 describes the relevant institutional and legal background of state aid 
programs. Section 4 presents our regression model framework and the identification strategy. Section 5 
describes the data and section 6 reports our main results. Section 7 provides a cost-benefit analysis 
contrasting our estimation results with external estimates on the impact of NBNs on economic output 
(GDP) and average funding expenditures. The final section concludes the paper with a review of its main 
results and compiles relevant policy conclusions that follow from our analysis. 
[3] 
 
2 Literature review 
Belloc et al. (2012) are the first to examine the impact of state aid measures on broadband coverage and 
adoption by utilizing a dataset for 30 OECD countries for the years 1995 to 2010. The authors demonstrate 
that the positive and statistically significant effect of demand-side policies is greater when broadband 
adoption is already developed, while the effect of supply-side policies decreases as the broadband market 
moves into its later stages. Montolio and Trillas (2013) measure how the level of broadband adoption is 
affected by an industrial policy variable that acts as a proxy for public policies and is calculated as 
government funding to private and public companies as a percentage of GDP. The authors utilize panel 
data for OECD and EU countries for the years 1999 to 2006. The estimation results indicate a positive, 
albeit insignificant, effect of public funding in all model specifications.  
Other empirical studies use more disaggregated data. Akerman et al. (2015) examine a Norwegian national 
broadband program that rolled out old broadband networks, using Norwegian firm-level data from 2000 to 
2008. The authors find that broadband coverage improves the labor market outcomes and productivity of 
skilled workers, but worsens it for unskilled workers. Duso et al. (2018) employ panel data on all 
municipalities in western Germany for the years from 2010 to 2015, to assess the impact of German state 
aid programs. The authors find that state aid significantly increased broadband availability in aid-receiving 
areas without impeding competition in broadband markets. Briglauer et al. (2019) also investigate the impact 
of the German state aid program for broadband deployment for the years from 2010 to 2015, but focusing 
only on municipalities of the German state of Bavaria. The authors find that aided municipalities have – 
depending on broadband quality – between a 16.8 and 23.2 percent higher broadband coverage than non-
aided municipalities. This increase in broadband coverage results in a small increase of employed individuals 
living in the respective aid-receiving municipalities (reducing depopulation). Canzian et al. (2019) provide 
an impact evaluation of a local policy program aimed at adoption of basic broadband in underserved rural 
and sparsely populated areas in the Italian province of Trento. Utilizing data on the infrastructure upgrade 
between 2011 and 2014, the authors find a positive impact of broadband availability on companies’ 
economic performance in terms of revenues and total factor productivity, but no indication that these effects 
are associated with changes in employment. Kandilov and Renkow (2020) estimate the rate of return of 
broadband loan and grant programs on the average payroll per worker using US zip code-level data for the 
period 1997 to 2007. The authors find that two of the smaller broadband programs likely had no effect on 
local payroll per worker, whereas the largest program in terms of funding and coverage likely had a positive 
impact. Whitacre and Gallardo (2020) are the first to include fiber-based broadband technologies in addition 
to basic broadband availability (25/3 Mbit/s downlink/uplink) utilizing US county-level panel data from 
2012 to 2018 to assess the impacts of state aid policies on total and rural broadband availability. The authors 
find a positive and significant impact of state aid programs on both measures of broadband availability. 
Although state aid had a measurable impact across all US counties, and a slightly higher one for rural areas, 
the average impact was small; for a typical county with an average rural broadband availability rate of 71.5% 
in 2018, the presence of state aid would raise it to 73.3%.  
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In summary, except for one paper using US county-level panel data, all available empirical studies are based 
on data measuring old broadband networks. Some studies indicate that state aid programs have been 
effective, albeit with some only showing a limited extent. As argued in the introductory section, broadband 
state aid policies entail the danger of the crowding out of private investment and various other inefficiencies. 
These concerns appear to have some support from the empirical literature, which points to small, and in 
some studies also to insignificant, statistical effects of state aid programs. Only a very few studies also 
examine indirect welfare-related effects of state aid such as local labour market effects. As far as NBN-
specific state aid programs are concerned, empirical evidence is still lacking almost entirely. 3 These gaps are 
remarkable in view of the enormous state aid funds that have already been provided by policy makers in the 
last two decades. An ex post evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of state aid programs seems to be 
much needed.  
3 Institutional and legal background 
In this section, we first outline relevant broadband access technologies and their evolution from narrowband 
internet to high-speed NBNs (section 3.1). We then describe the main economic rationales for the funding 
of NBNs (section 3.2) and the relevant EU state aid rules and state aid practice in developed non-EU 
countries (section 3.3). 
3.1 Evolution of broadband internet access technologies  
Narrowband access networks were first upgraded via xDSL technologies capable of delivering broadband 
services via twisted-pair copper lines some 20 years ago. Even though xDSL broadband access technologies 
can support the simultaneous use of voice, video, and data services on an IP-basis, their performance and 
capabilities were technically limited by the remaining length of the copper-based part of the local access 
network. This technological restriction in old broadband technologies can be mitigated by deploying NBNs 
based on fiber-optic transmission technologies and network infrastructures. The closer fiber connections 
are deployed to the customer’s premise in the access network, the higher the quality characteristics (such as 
bandwidth levels) that can be offered to customers; wireline “fiberization” scenarios include various 
technologies and network architectures and give rise to different deployment costs (Briglauer et al., 2020a; 
Timmers et al., 2018). In simplified terms, fiber-optic cables can either be deployed to the premises of 
consumers (“high-end fiber”) or still partly rely on “old” copper wire and coaxial cable connections in the 
remaining segment of the access network (“hybrid-fiber”) connecting the customer premises with the last 
distribution point. From that point on, all data transmission is fiber-based.  
                                                     
3 A few more empirical contributions including policy reports, conducted on behalf of public institutions, exist. They 
do not provide, however, credible identification strategies and are thus excluded from the literature review. We also 
did not review simulation-based studies. 
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Mobile (wireless) broadband services have become very popular since the rollout of 4G networks began in 
2010. Even though corresponding mobile broadband technologies have been deployed on a nationwide 
scale in most countries, the average quality and stability of data transmission available to individual 
consumers depends on a host of factors and is on average still below quality levels provided by wireline 
hybrid-fiber networks. This could, however, change drastically with further advances in mobile access 
technologies. 5G, in particular, is expected to yield disruptive changes in quality dimensions with, for 
example, bandwidth levels up to several Gbit/s (Briglauer et al., 2020a). 
In view of the coverage targets as defined in the EC´s gigabit strategy (European Commission, 2016) and 
in most other developed countries (OECD, 2018), NBNs must be at least partly fiber-based in the access 
network in order to enable bandwidth levels of at least 100 Mbit/s. Where NBNs include hybrid-fiber 
technologies, 4G mobile technologies cannot, generally speaking, realize these targeted bandwidth levels. 
As 5G networks have not been deployed before 2020, we therefore exclude mobile broadband from our 
empirical analysis, which covers the deployment period 2002 to 2019.  
3.2 Economic rationales for state aid 
The main economic rationale for state aid refers to positive externalities from broadband networks (NBNs). 
Market failure can refer to suboptimal levels of geographic coverage, speed of network deployment, and 
suboptimal quality levels of broadband services (or all three) as perceived by consumers. Bertschek et al. 
(2016) review more than 60 studies that investigate the causal effects of broadband networks and related 
services. The authors generally find positive effects for the most relevant economic outcomes such as 
economic growth (e.g., Czernich et al., 2011) and employment as well as productivity (e.g., Akerman et al., 
2015). Although only very few empirical studies (e.g., Briglauer and Gugler, 2019) exist that explicitly include 
NBN data (recently surveyed in Abrardi and Cambini, 2019), NBNs are expected to provide a similar or 
even a higher potential in terms of productivity increases and economic growth. Furthermore, the adoption 
of (high-speed) broadband services by consumers and the corresponding usage of a large variety of 
broadband services are most likely to create substantial amounts of consumer surplus in aggregate. Early 
estimates on basic broadband adoption (Greenstein and McDevitt, 2011) as well as newer studies on NBNs 
(Katz and Callorda, 2020) indeed suggest massive gains in consumer surplus. Overall, empirical evidence 
supports the key assumption underlying state aid programs according to which NBNs generate massive 
externalities and rents for consumers.  
On this basis, state aid programs to cover white areas might accrue substantial welfare gains if implemented 
in an effective way and without substantially crowding out private investment. White areas will be present 
in most countries, because broadband deployment is particularly investment-intensive in local access 
networks due to construction costs related to civil work for digging and laying down optical cables, 
accounting for 60% to 70% of the total deployment costs, followed by duct costs and fiberglass (Curram et 
al., 2019). These costs are mostly fixed and, in fact, sunk. Since access networks branch out in a tree-like 
structure, renewing access infrastructure involves fewer customers the closer one gets to the final consumer, 
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that is, the deeper fiber is deployed to customer premises. This means that rollout costs will be distributed 
among fewer customers and hence average cost per customer will be higher (“economies of density”). Given 
the economics of broadband (NBN) deployment, it is unlikely that private investment will be induced by 
market conditions on a nationwide scale including areas with low population densities. Accordingly, most 
EU member states – as well as other non-EU developed countries – implemented national broadband plans 
including state aid measures, particularly since the DAE was published in 2010, to realize predefined 
ubiquitous broadband coverage targets (Feasey et al., 2018).  
Reference is sometimes also made to equality concerns demanding ubiquitous service provision as well as 
affordability of basic broadband services for all citizens and households. These policy issues are, however, 
typically not part of state aid programs but tackled under the so-called “universal service obligation” 
frameworks (the latter also provide industry or state-funded financial resources for providing universal 
access to (very) basic internet services, publicly available telephone services, and to directories and directory 
enquiry services in the EU). Whereas affordability can be a problem in urban as well as in rural areas, 
availability of basic broadband infrastructure is a problem specific to remote areas. Not all EU and OECD 
member states include broadband in their universal service framework (OECD, 2018, p. 22). In these cases, 
political concerns on a digital divide between rural and urban areas or across income groups are embedded 
as a goal in national broadband targets and related to state aid programs.  
3.3 State aid rules in the European Union and international funding practice4 
State aid is subject to legal constraints in most jurisdictions. Compliance with broadband-specific state aid 
rules – adopted in 2009 (European Commission, 2009) and revised in 2013 (European Commission, 2013) 
– should ensure that state aid does not crowd out private investment or lead to an overcompensation of the 
funded network operator. 
In order to reach ubiquitous coverage targets and to accrue positive externalities, the EC supports state aid 
for broadband network (NBN) deployment in rural and underserved white areas where no broadband 
infrastructure exists or where no plans by private investors to roll out such an infrastructure exist for the 
near future. In monopolistic or so-called “grey” areas where only one private broadband network operator 
is present currently (and for the foreseeable future), a more detailed assessment is required for state aid 
approval, as market distortions and crowding out of private investment become more likely (European 
Commission, 2013, §44-46). State aid in competitive “black” areas with two or more broadband 
infrastructures existing in parallel is not permissible (European Commission, 2013, §43).5 About 91% of all 
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5 Only a very few of the developed countries refrained from providing state aid due to country-specific features related 
to high levels of infrastructure competition and/or demographic and topographic characteristics; a notable example is 
the Netherlands where duopolistic competition resulted in a nationwide “black”area with no scope for state aid policies 
according to the EU regulatory framework. 
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state aid cases in the EU reference extending NBNs to white areas, whereas the other cases refer to 
increasing competition and technological upgrades in grey areas as primary reasons (Feasey et al., 2018, p. 
73). This can also be observed for developed countries outside the EU which are not subjected to a similar 
supranational jurisdiction. Accordingly, most national broadband plans are targeted to deploy broadband in 
rural (white) areas (OECD, 2018; Feasey et al., 2018) and – in view of ubiquitous coverage targets – to 
expand network coverage on the supply side rather than adoption on the demand side. Direct supply-side 
stimuli mostly consist of direct grants or soft loans. Governmental intervention is sometimes also based on 
partial public ownership and engagement models such as “private-public partnerships”, where both types 
of partners contribute with certain comparative advantages. The most interventionist form of public 
engagement is in terms of direct infrastructural investment where the government owns parts of or the 
entire network infrastructure. Australia and New Zealand favored such interventionist approaches and so 
far have provided the highest per capita state aid funds.6 
The typical funding projects involve direct grants and are subject to an open tender with a funding period 
of three to five years (Feasey et al., 2018, p. 73). Open tenders are designed to allow for non-discriminatory 
participation on the basis of ex ante known selection criteria (European Commission, 2013, §12). The EC´s 
state aid rules (European Commission 2013, § (10)) allow for different forms of state aid funds which can 
be implemented in combination at the EU, national, or local level. Within the EU, approximately 65% of 
all state aid funds were provided at national level by member states and 35% by various European funds. In 
addition to regional funds provided by the EC, the European Investment Bank has lent between €2-3 billion 
per year in soft loans to private NBN operators since 2014 (Feasey et al., 2018, p. 36-39). 
4 Estimation framework 
In what follows, we first discuss the economics of NBN investment (section 4.1) and then describe our 
estimation and identification strategy (section 4.2). 
4.1 The economics of investment in NBN 
4.1.1 Dynamics of investment 
We use a dynamic approach to incorporate real world NBN deployment patterns. As the broadband-related 
empirical literature (e.g., Grajek and Röller 2012; Bacache et al., 2014; Briglauer et al., 2018, 2020b; Whitacre 
and Gallardo, 2020) suggests, static models are not appropriate, as these would only account for effects that 
have an immediate impact on the infrastructure stock. We use a partial adjustment model, since network 
operators are most likely not able to adjust their broadband infrastructure stock to prevalent market 
conditions within one period due to substantial market rigidities related to, for example, construction work 
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https://www.nbnco.com.au/ (last accessed July 5th 2021). 
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(such as shortages in civil engineering capacities) or regulations (such as rights of way, negotiations with 
house owners or coinvesting operators, or rigidities related to complex and bureaucratic application 
procedures for state aid funds). Thus, adjustment to current market shocks will not only affect the 
infrastructure stock contemporaneously but also in future periods, and hence adjustment to a long-run 
optimal infrastructure stock takes time. We first assume that this targeted or desired NBN infrastructure 
stock is given by 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷′ +  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
(1) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  reflects the long-run optimal infrastructure stock for country i at time t. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
observations on all relevant explanatory variables, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents country-specific fixed effects, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. In view of ubiquitous NBN targets at EU, but also at the national level in most 
OECD states, the desired infrastructure stock, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , corresponds to a 100% household coverage based 
on a certain quality level in target year t.7 We further assume that the change in infrastructure stock follows 
a partial adjustment process: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 =  𝜆𝜆�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ −  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (2) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the actual number of deployed NBN connections in country i at time t. For every period, 
a constant share of the remaining gap between the desired (*) and previous infrastructure stock (t-1) is 
closed, with 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 and 𝜆𝜆 representing the “speed of adjustment” coefficient. Next to capturing 
rigidities, the adjustment coefficient also captures increasing marginal costs of NBN deployment across 
areas; deployment costs are lowest in (sub-)urban areas, and (much) higher in (very remote) rural areas. As 
discussed in section 3, white areas that received most of the available state aid funds in the past are 
characterized by low population densities and, hence, high average deployment costs per customer premises.  
Substituting equation (1) in equation (2) yields:  
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜸𝜸′+ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (3) 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜆𝜆𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 =  𝜆𝜆𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, 𝛼𝛼1 = 1 −  𝜆𝜆, and γ =  𝜆𝜆𝜷𝜷. Short-run effects are given by 𝜸𝜸, and 
estimates of 𝜷𝜷 reflect the long-run effects of the variables in vector 𝑿𝑿 on the desired infrastructure stock. 
The dynamic specification of equation (3) can be empirically tested. If 𝛼𝛼1 is equal to 0, then there are no 
dynamics or inertia, whereas coefficient estimates between 0 and 1 are consistent with a dynamic adjustment 
process that leads to the long-run desired infrastructure stock. Besides testing the average level of dynamics 
in our specification, we can also test if the dynamics depend on some variables in X (we will be particularly 
interested in knowing if state aid changes the dynamics) by including appropriate interaction terms.  
                                                     
7 For instance, the EC´s gigabit society strategy foresees 100% household coverage with at least 100 Mbit/s in 2025. 
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4.1.2 Determinants of investment 
Network operators will base their investment decision on the net present value of a certain infrastructure 
project j (NPVj). The project will be undertaken in case the project earns a higher discounted profit than 
the next best investment opportunity over a certain period of time (t = 1,…,T), that is, if8 




𝑖𝑖=1 > 0, (4) 
where the parameter r is the discount or “hurdle” rate capturing opportunity costs of the next best alternative 
and uncertainty about future profit streams. The parameter 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 denotes net cash flows in period t, that is, 
revenues from operation minus costs in terms of capital and operating expenditures. During the first periods 
of an NBN project, capital expenditure (CAPEX) typically yields negative cash flows due to substantial 
physical deployment costs, including labour costs for construction work, which also includes replacement 
of internal wiring within buildings in the case of high-end fiber deployments, network planning and 
administration, equipment, and materials costs. In later periods, revenues from sales to retail consumers or 
from wholesale access to reselling operators will typically dominate the operating cost (OPEX), ultimately 
yielding positive net cash flows. Revenues are typically subject to much higher uncertainty than costs but 
are expected to outweigh operation costs as the latter constitute only a minor share of total costs.9  
CAPEX crucially depends on population or household density as average deployment costs tend to be lower 
in (sub-)urban areas due to shorter distances to individual households and businesses and as more people 
can be reached by a specific investment activity (“economies of density”). Next to population density, major 
CAPEX determinants of NBN deployment are further related to topographical factors such as ground 
conditions, preexisting network infrastructure elements (such as the quality of ducts and poles and space 
for new fiber-optical cables or the availability of dark fibre as an alternative to ducts and poles), and finally 
regulations such as rights of way and provisions on network cooperation or wholesale access obligations. 
Note that most of these CAPEX determinants, such as the population density, either show no, or only very 
low, variation over time and are thus largely captured by country-specific fixed effects (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖’s). In contrast, 
OPEX-related determinants, such as leases paid to owners of ducts and dark fiber as well as energy and 
maintenance costs, tend to be time variant but represent a small share of overall costs (Curram et al., 2019). 
4.2 Estimation and identification strategy 
We estimate equation (3) by instrumental variables (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) 
techniques, and use different sets of external and internal instruments for endogenous variables in X. In 
particular, our main variable of interest, the state aid supporting NBN, is likely to be endogenous for a 
                                                     
8 A report prepared for BEREC cites survey-based evidence according to which network operators indeed conduct 
NPV-based analysis when evaluating individual NBN projects (Curram et al., 2019). 
9 Virtually all CAPEX costs for a given area are fixed and sunk. The OPEX costs include both the fixed (but not sunk) 
elements, such as lease paid to the duct owners, for instance, as well as variable components, such as wages. 
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number of reasons. The state aid variable may to be subject to reverse causality in equation (3), as the 
regulators may speed up or slow down the introduction of state aid programs to take into account the 
current levels of NBN infrastructure deployment and the gap between the current and the desired levels. 
Moreover, other regulatory interventions may complement or substitute for the state aid. Most importantly, 
the access regulations, which aim at creating more competition in the broadband provision markets, can 
lead to omitted variable bias in equation (3). While we add access regulation variables, as a robustness check 
for our main results, the more general endogeneity concerns still require an appropriate estimation 
technique.10 
Since equation (3) represents a dynamic panel data model with unobserved country-specific effects, we apply 
the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), also known as a difference GMM estimator. GMM 
panel data estimators have been commonly used in ICT-related empirical studies to address the issue of 
endogeneity in the absence of appropriate external instruments (Bloom et al., 2012; Briglauer et al., 2018; 
Cardona et al., 2013; Dimelis and Papaioannou, 2011; Whiteacre and Gallardo, 2020). Additionally, we 
utilize the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). Both types of estimators allow for 
inclusion of additional external instruments, or moment conditions in the case of GMM. While the IV 
estimator is less efficient than the GMM, it is also less subject to the overfitting problem (Roodman, 2009) 
and allows for additional specification tests on the first stage results. 
As regards external instruments, we employ the following distinct sources of exogenous variation. First, we 
construct geographic Hausman-type instrumental variables measuring the average levels of NBN 
deployment and state aid in all other OECD member states in the sample (Briglauer and Gugler, 2019). 
Both variables are defined as the ratio of total NBN deployment (total number of implemented state aid 
programs) in 31 OECD states (i.e., other than the focal country i) to the total number of other countries 
(i.e., 31). Due to NBN target-related benchmarking effects, we expect that below-average states in terms of 
state aid provision or average NBN deployment urge national politicians to catch up.11  
                                                     
10 Simple correlation analysis reveals positive relation between our measure of state aid and access regulation on one 
hand and net neutrality, another regulatory intervention in the broadband markets, on the other hand. While the 
correlations are not very strong, 0.361 and 0.227, respectively, the correlation coefficients are statistically significant. 
Since net neutrality has been shown to discourage NBN investment (Briglauer et al., 2020b), the potential omitted 
variable bias goes against our expected result on state aid thereby making our estimates more conservative. Similarly 
to net neutrality, access regulation has also been shown to generally discourage infrastructure investment, but the 
incentives may go the other way for some operators (Grajek and Röller, 2012; Briglauer et al. 2018). 
11 For instance, in its gigabit strategy, the EC explicitly acknowledges the great success of the former broadband policy 
target in that “[a]t national level, setting objectives has become the cornerstone of broadband deployment public 
policy. … Many member states have indeed aligned their national or regional NGN [=next generation networks = 
NBN in our context] plans to the DAE speeds” (European Commission, 2016, p. 31). This indicates that national 
politicians are under pressure not to fall behind broadband market developments in other comparable countries, both 
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Second, we construct instruments related to political ideology measuring the overall degree of governmental 
intervention in the economy (Montolio and Trillas, 2013) as well as the share of left-liberal legislators 
(Whitearce and Gallardo, 2020) in a country, hypothesizing that a high share of public expenditures in 
general and more left-liberal governments are good predictors for (NBN) state aid programs. These political 
economy variables capture the level of public participation in infrastructure projects. We expect them to 
positively correlate with the state aid for NBN deployment. 
5 Data 
We employ a balanced panel data set of 32 OECD member states for the period 2002 to 2019 for dependent 
and independent variables, with a maximum number of 576 observations.12 In constructing our data, we 
use the following sources. First, our source for the dependent variables is the database of FTTH (Fiber to 
the Home) Council Europe, which includes annual numbers of deployed and adopted fiber-based 
broadband lines for OECD member states (section 5.1). Second, we use several OECD databases, in 
particular data from “Digital Economy Outlook” and “Economic Outlook”. The construction of state aid 
variables (section 5.2) is based on our own research, publicly available information published by national 
government departments and regulatory agencies, as well as on personal correspondence with 
representatives of these institutions. Finally, we employ several other data sets to construct our control and 
instrumental variables (sections 5.3 and 5.4).  
Table 1 (at the end of this paper) shows descriptive statistics of all variables used in the estimation of 
equation (3). Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the sources and provides definitions of the variables.  
5.1 Dependent variable: NBN investment 
Our dependent variable measures household weighted investments in new fiber-based broadband networks, 
denoted with FiberCov. Fiber investment is measured in real terms as the number of connections deployed, 
representing the NBN infrastructure stock in a given country (this measure of investment in broadband 
networks is also used in Briglauer et al., 2020b). Related to NBN investment, NBN adoption, denoted with 
FiberAdop, measures the number of adopting consumers and businesses that also show a willingness to pay 
for NBN-related content and services under a commercial contract.  
In constructing our dependent variable, FiberCov, we include all relevant fiber-based broadband access 
architectures, which either deploy fiber-optic cables directly to the premises of consumers (“high-end fiber”) 
or partly rely on “old” copper wire and coaxial cable connections in the remaining segment of the access 
network (“hybrid-fiber”). Table A.1 describes in more detail the relevant fiber-based architectures (“Fiber 
                                                     
in terms of target setting and actual deployment levels; such benchmarking effects get reinforced under the 
supranational EU framework. 
12 Because our estimators involve first differencing and internal instruments lagged by two periods, up to 512 
observations are used in the estimations.  
[12] 
 
to the x”, FTTx). Note that by considering all relevant FTTx network architectures, we make sure to employ 
a measure of NBN investments that the state aid programs targeted. 
Figure 1 depicts mean values of household weighted numbers of NBN investment (FiberCov ) and adoption 
(FiberAdop) in OECD countries for the years 2003 to 2019. One can first infer that only a fraction of installed 
NBN connections are also adopted by consumers. Second, both operator investment and consumer 
adoption follow a dynamic and non-linear adjustment and adoption process, respectively. Third, one can 
observe overprovisioning of households on average due to multiple infrastructures in some (sub-)urban 
areas since 2013 (see horizontal line at 1). The Netherlands, for instance, exhibits the second highest 
population density in Europe, duopolistic legacy infrastructures and about eight million private households 
covered with multiple FTTx technologies in parallel; about 7.3 million homes are passed by FTTC/VDSL 
technologies based on former monopolist infrastructures and also by FTTN/DOCSIS technologies based 
on coaxial-cable infrastructures in 2020. In addition, new entrants deployed about 3.3 million FTTH/B 
connections based on own infrastructure elements (including municipalities) until the end of our period of 
analysis. This market situation results in an average household coverage of 2.24 FTTx lines per household. 
Note, however, that high average household coverage does not imply ubiquitous household coverage. On 
the contrary, most countries still exhibit low household coverage in rural areas (European Commission, 
2020), where average deployment costs are high and the speed of adjustment is low. Fourth, low fiber 
adoption rates represent a serious welfare concern, as only (output-oriented) adoption to NBN connections 
and consumers utilizing related services and applications enables broadband as a general-purpose 
technology, and generates the concomitant welfare effects; the latter are expected to be much higher than 
those related to direct investment-related multiplier effects. 
Figure 1: NBN investment and adoption household shares (OECD mean values for 2003-2019) 
 




5.2 Main independent variable: State aid 
Almost all funding programs in the past have been implemented at national levels and targeted the supply 
side (section 3.3). Therefore, in constructing our state aid variable, we focused on supply-side oriented 
funding programs as provided by national governments in OECD member states. Based on publicly 
available information published by governmental departments and regulatory agencies we collected 
information on funding programs that targeted rollout of the NBN technologies (Table A.2 lists all relevant 
sources of national- and EU-level state aid programs in OECD countries). 
In line with most empirical contributions (e.g., Whiteacre and Gallardo, 2020), we construct a binary 
variable, denoted StateAid, indicating if there is a national state aid programme supporting NBN deployment 
in a given year in a certain country. We test the short-term and long-term effects of introducing state aid 
programs, which allows us to answer our research questions and derive relevant policy implications. 
5.3 Control variables 
As discussed in section 4.1, our controls include multiple measures of competitive intensity (W), costs (C), 
and revenues (R). The variable FixMobSub measures competition stemming from broadband wireless mobile 
networks. According to the discussion in section 3.1, 4G-based mobile broadband technologies have exerted 
significant competitive pressure on wireline NBN technologies since 2010. Competition within broadband 
wireline markets further depends on the extent of the market share of the legacy xDSL technology and 
infrastructure, ShareDSL, owned by former monopolistic incumbent operators, and measures the degree of 
remaining market power of incumbent operators. Next to the infrastructure-based competition from both 
wireline and wireless networks, service-based competition can also exist. Various mandatory access 
regulations, which can interfere with the state aid regulations, aim at inducing additional competition in the 
broadband service provision by allowing new entrants to use parts of the existing infrastructure. The 
variables AccessReg and AccessPrice capture those regulations, as imposed on the NBN infrastructure and older 
broadband infrastructure of market dominant operators, respectively.13 
The vector of cost determinants C includes the long-term interest rate, IntRate, to capture opportunity costs 
related to NBN deployment projects. Deployment costs crucially depend on topographic and demographic 
characteristics, and therefore on the extent of urban and rural areas and housing structure. The variables 
RuralPop and ShareAppr capture the number of people living in rural areas and the number of apartments 
per building, and hence economies of density in broadband (NBN) deployment. Costs are further 
determined by construction costs; the variable Wages proxies the costs of construction work which 
represents by far the largest share of total deployment costs.  
The vector of revenue covariates R contains micro-founded determinants of demand, measuring 
households’ income by GDP per capita, GDPpc, and households’ ICT budget, CommExp. The age 
dependency ratio, AgeDepRatio, measures the number of users who typically exhibit lower ICT affinity 
                                                     
13 These variables are available for a subset of our sample, though. 
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and/or willingness to pay for ICT services. Revenues for future NBN services can also be positively affected 
by the price level for telecommunications services in general, TeleServP. The total number of internet users, 
IntUsers, measures the potential market size of consumers eventually adopting NBN services and content. 
Content is measured by the market entrance of Netflix, Netflix. Video streaming services meanwhile 
represent more than 60% of global internet download traffic and hence the “killer app” of NBN. Being one 
of the most famous providers of streaming services, Netflix represents about 15% of global internet 
download traffic.14  
5.4 Instrumental variables  
External instrumental variables, as noted in section 4.2, include the variable LftWng, which measures the 
share of left-liberal legislators, and the variable GovExp, which measures the share of public expenditures. 
Hausman-type geographic instruments related to the average development regarding state aid and NBN 
deployment in all other 31 states are denoted with StateAid31 and FiberCov31, respectively. 
6 Estimation results 
Table 2 reports the main estimation results of our empirical model, as captured by equation (5). However, 
we include in Table 2 only those variables from the full set of explanatory variables, as described in Tables 
1 and A.1, that turned out to be significant in our estimations at least once, and report the other results as 
further tests and robustness checks in Tables 3 and 3.A.  
Columns (1) through (5) in Table 2 all use the same set of explanatory variables, but a different set of internal 
and external instruments. In particular, columns (1) through (3) follow Anderson and Hsiao’s (1981) two-
stage least squares (2SLS) approach; after first-differencing equation (5), which removes country-specific 
effects, we use lagged values of the lagged dependent variable, FiberCov(t-1), and the endogenous variables, 
StateAid and FixMobileSub, as internal instruments, and differenced or lagged values of StateAid31, 
FiberCov31, LftWng, and GovExp, as external instruments.15 Columns (4) and (5) follow a more efficient 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) one-step GMM approach, which also uses first-difference transformation and 
the same set of internal and external instruments as in columns (1) and (3), respectively, but includes further 
instruments, or (stacked) moment conditions, for the lagged dependent variable. Because the increased 
                                                     
14 Information available at: https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/netflix-15-percent-internet-bandwidth-
worldwide-study-1202963207/ (last accessed July 5th 2021). 
15 Next to StateAid, we also suspect FixMobileSubs to suffer from reverse causality, as the mobile operators may react 
to the NBN-enabled broadband offerings of fixed-line operators. Table A.4 in the Appendix reports an exemplary set 
of first-stage results corresponding to column (3) in Table 2, that is, the model with the smallest set of instruments. 
The instruments are strong, as evidenced by the F-tests of excluded instruments and the partial R2 statistics; the 
coefficients have economically meaningful signs. The models in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 add instruments by 
substituting the instruments based on differenced values with the ones based on levels and/or including the 
instruments lagged by more periods. The first-stage results of these models are available from the authors upon request.  
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efficiency of the Arellano-Bond estimator over the Anderson-Hsiao estimator may come at the cost of 
overfitting the model (Roodman, 2009), we keep the number of instruments used low and report it in Table 
2 next to the number of clusters and observations in the estimation sample. A test of joint significance of 
explanatory variables, a test of second-order serial correlation in the residuals, and the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions provide additional diagnostics, which show that our model is correctly specified.16  
The results in Table 2 are robust to the use of a specific estimator, 2SLS or GMM, and a specific set of 
instruments across columns. For the interpretation of the results, it is important to stress that this is the 
cross-time variation in our data that identifies the coefficients, as the cross-sectional variation is removed 
by means of first differencing. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is highly statistically 
significant and ranges from 0.440 in column (1) to 0.676 in column (5), with an average of 0.563. Thus, the 
use of a partial-adjustment model in capturing the dynamics of NBN investment is warranted and the speed 
of adjustment (λ=1-𝛼𝛼1) is about 0.437. 
The impact of control variables on NBN deployment is both non-negligible and economically meaningful 
in our model. The competition from mobile broadband, as captured by the variable FixMobSubs, shows a 
statistically significant (in four out of five columns in Table 2) and positive effect. Its coefficient equals 0.66 
on average across columns, which means that an increase in mobile competition by one standard deviation 
increases NBN coverage by some 12.5 percentage points in the short term (0.66*0.19=0.1254) and 28.7 
percentage points in the long term (0.1254/(1-0.563)=0.2870).  
The demand shifters show a weaker impact in our model. The age dependency ratio, AgeDepRatio, is positive, 
but only marginally significant when using the 2SLS estimator, and insignificant when using the GMM 
estimator, in Table 2. The coefficient AgeDepRatio equals 0.011 on average, which means that an increase of 
the share of the young and the old in the population by one standard deviation leads to some 6.2 percentage 
points more NBN infrastructure in the short term (0.11*6.67=0.0618) and 14.1 percentage points in the 
long term (0.0618/(1-0.563)=0.1414). Though statistically weak, this result is unexpected. A possible 
interpretation is that this is the impact of the young, which more than offsets the demand of the old for 
NBN-based services, as compared to working age groups. The impact of GDP per capita is positive, as 
expected, but significant at the 10% level in only one out of five estimations in Table 2.  
The cost shifters show a stronger impact on the NBN investment than the demand shifters. Both the share 
of rural population, RuralPop, and the long-term interest rate, IntRate, are statistically significant across all 
five columns in Table 2 and return an average coefficient of -4.127 and -0.017, respectively. The negative 
sign on the coefficients are as expected. The estimated magnitude of the effect of rural population appears 
high; one standard deviation increase in RuralPop decreases the NBN coverage by 49.5 percentage points in 
the short term (-4.127*0.12=-0.4952) and 113 percentage points in the long term (-0.4952/(1-0.563)=-
                                                     




1.133). However, rural population is a slow-changing variable; even small changes over a short period may 
be informative of a longer trend, the latter being more important for long-term infrastructure investments.17 
The impact of interest rate is an order of magnitude smaller; one standard deviation increase lowers the 
NBN coverage by 4.9 percentage points in the short term (-0.017*2.87=-0.0488) and 11.2 percentage points 
in the long term (-0.0488/(1-0.563)=-0.1116). 
Finally, our variable of interest, StateAid, proves to be highly statistically and economically significant. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level in each of the five specifications in Table 2 and the average 
magnitude across specifications equals 0.290. This means that the existence of a state aid program directed 
at NBNs increases the coverage in the studied countries by 29 percentage points on average in the short 
term. The long-term impact equals 66.3 percentage points (0.290/(1-0.563)=0.6632).  
The inclusion of additional controls, as shown in Tables 3 and 3.A, generally leaves the main results 
unaffected.18 In particular, the inclusion of time-trend variables in Table 3 does not significantly change the 
results. One noticeable exception is column (4) in Table 3, in which we control for the existence of regulated 
access to the NBN infrastructure in a subsample of our data. In this specification, the StateAid coefficient 
equals 0.209 and is significant at the 10% level. Whereas this shows the robustness of our result on state aid 
to controlling for other forms of state intervention (and to a significant reduction of the estimation sample 
size), it also behooves us to interpret the estimated magnitude of StateAid coefficient cautiously. Last, but 
not least, Table 3 provides additional evidence on the dynamic effects of state aid policies. As explained in 
section 4.1.1 and motivated in the introductory section, by including the interaction term FiberCov(t-
1)*StateAid(t), we can test whether the state aid has a real long-term impact by increasing total NBN coverage 
or merely whether it speeds up the investments that would take place anyway. For instance, a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term would mean that 𝛼𝛼1 goes down, hence the adjustment speed, as measured 
by λ, goes up, in the presence of state aid regulations. A sufficient increase of the coefficient on StateAid 
accompanying this could leave the long-term impact of StateAid unchanged. Taken together, the state aid 
regulation would then only affect the speed, but not the ultimate level of deployed infrastructure. The 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term in column (3) suggests, however, that the state 
                                                     
17 Note that rural population has a two-fold impact on the NBN profitability: an immediate one on the deployment 
costs and a long-term one on future revenues. If rural population migrates to small towns, for instance, this makes the 
case for covering small towns with NBN stronger, especially if the migration trend continuous in the long term. We 
also need to reiterate that the NBN coverage measure in our sample can exceed 100%, because the parallel coverage 
of multiple alternative infrastructures in particular in black (sub-)urban areas leads to duplication of access lines. In 
fact, coverage goes as high as 286% for the small state of Luxembourg where the state-owned incumbent operators 
offer NBN services based on all FTTx technologies. In light of this, the coefficient on RuralPop is not unreasonably 
high. 
18 For the expositional purpose, the robustness checks in Tables 3 and 3.A take column (5) in Table 2 as the baseline 
specification. The results of the robustness checks are, however, representative of the other specifications and available 
from the authors upon request.  
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aid had no impact on the speed of adjustment, whereas its direct impact on the NBN coverage remains 
strong, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on StateAid in column (3). 
7 Costs and benefits of state aid programs 
Given substantial expenditures for state aid programs during NBN deployment in the last two decades, it is 
important to quantify total benefits and costs when evaluating the overall efficiency of such programs. In 
order to conduct a rudimentary cost-benefit calculation, we first relate our estimates of the average impact 
of state aid programs on NBN deployment to average effects of NBN on GDP using an external study 
(Briglauer and Gugler, 2019). In order to make a conservative assessment, we evaluate benefits on lower 
bounds of respective coefficient estimates. We then contrast the imputed GDP per capita benefit with 
external estimates on average per capita state aid expenditures (Feasey et al., 2018; Bourreau et al., 2020).  
According to our analysis in section 6, state aid exerts a significant and positive impact on NBN investment. 
The lowest coefficient estimate for the variable StateAid (as reported for our main estimation results in Table 
2 in column 1) is 0.220, implying that having a state aid program in place increased household weighted 
NBN investment on average by about 22 percentage points, or 28.2% when evaluated at the grand mean 
value (Table 1: 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0.78) in the short term. The long-term values equal 39.3 percentage points 
(0.220/(1-0.44)) and 50.4% (28.2%/(1-0.44)), respectively. Next, in order to find an elasticity of GDP with 
respect to NBNs, we refer to Briglauer and Gugler (2019), who estimate the impact of NBN adoption on 
GPD using various NBN-adoption variables. The authors identify the elasticity to be in the interval of 0.002 
to 0.005. As one can infer from Figure 1, NBN adoption is, however, lagging far behind NBN investment. 
Therefore, we must consider that adoption rates, which relate NBN adoption to NBN investment, are 
substantially below 1. From the data underlying Figure 1, we infer that after the initial years with very low 
fiber deployment (and adoption), the average adoption rate was about 0.33 in the period 2005-2019. Taking 
all these estimates into account and evaluating at the grand mean of GDP per capita in our data (Table 1: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = $40,000), we find a conservative estimate of the impact of state aid on increase in GDP per capita 
per year. The short-term impact is about $7.45 (0.002*0.282*0.33*$40,000), which gradually rises to $13.30 
in the long term (0.002*0.504*0.33*$40,000).  
Next, we need to identify per capita expenditures on NBN-specific state aid programs. Table 4 presents 
country-specific estimates of the expenditures. Within the EU, several member states spent less than €5 per 
capita in total over 16 years (2003 to 2018), whereas Italy and France, which top the list, spent €145.4 and 
€214.8 per capita, or $9.09 and $13.43 per capita per year, respectively. Thus, the highest state aid spending 
in Europe roughly corresponds to the average values in terms of the GDP increase. Outside Europe, state 
aid was highest in Australia ($101.24 per capita per year), Korea ($32.91 per capita per year), and New 
Zealand ($24.55 per capita per year). Overall, based on the data from 29 out of 33 countries in our analysis 
over the last decade or so, the average state aid spending was $9.32 per capita per year. Contrasting this cost 
figure with the average benefit, as reported above, shows that the state aid programs are indeed highly 
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efficient. On average, the benefits outweigh the costs as early as in the second year of a program, and the 
programs “break even” in the third year.19 It must be stressed that the NBN infrastructure’s lifetime vastly 
exceeds 18 years, the time span of our analysis, so the cost-benefit calculation is even more advantageous 
than these numbers suggest, as the benefits remain even if the state aid spending runs out. 
These figures reveal that total benefits, as measured by GDP, outweigh total costs and hence state aid 
programs, on average, have created value in the past. Moreover, we likely underestimate total benefits related 
to NBNs. First, we must acknowledge the imperfect nature of GDP as a measure of the economic benefits 
of broadband (NBNs), as not all value created by broadband deployment is captured in standard measures 
of GDP. In particular, GDP measures just income and not economic welfare. Moreover, the distinction 
between process and product innovations is important here. Process innovations make current products 
cheaper to produce, insofar that spillovers in other sectors of the economy are captured for producer surplus 
(profits are a part of GDP), but not for consumer surplus. Second, if more broadband leads to more product 
innovations in other sectors of the economy but with a time lag, we would also be underestimating the 
overall benefits of broadband, since we capture only contemporaneous benefits (Briglauer and Gugler, 
2019). Finally, the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis shows the utmost importance of the digital economy 
to mitigate the damages of global economic and social shutdowns; this exhibits another major source of a 
positive externality during an economic crisis, which is not captured in the literature so far. 
8 Conclusions and policy implications 
Whereas some of the available empirical studies found only minor and even insignificant effects of 
broadband (NBN)-specific state aid programs, our results point to a strong average effect of state aid, which 
will increase the total NBN coverage by facilitating additional connections for 40% of households (or more) 
in the long term. These results are robust with respect to a variety of econometric specifications and control 
variables. Interestingly, while our results reveal strong positive effects on average, the underlying data shows 
significant discrepancies across countries in terms of extent to which they applied state aid. The most striking 
difference is between Australia and the Netherlands, which spent in total $1,721 and $1.5 per capita, 
respectively, during the period 2003-2018. The differences across countries are to some extent explained by 
the market conditions, but they also point to an unutilized potential for those countries, which lag behind. 
Whereas the state aid programs increase the total NBN coverage, they seem have no effect on the speed of 
NBN deployment. This result seems counterintuitive, but could be explained by at least two things. First, 
state aid is typically subject to highly bureaucratic processes; in Europe, for instance, all the EU, national 
and, local government levels are involved, which creates a complex system to navigate for infrastructure 
                                                     
19 The term “break even” is slightly abused here, as the GDP increase is hardly a revenue, which would be required for 
a proper break-even analysis. Still, we stick to this notion, as it captures well some of the major NBN related 
externalities that we have in mind and the main result is insensitive to the discount rate applied. 
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providers and for local fund applicants and may slow down the investment process. Second, there is some 
anecdotal evidence of regulatory gaming. Since the private infrastructure providers expect the politicians to 
grant state aid, if broadband targets are not met, they delay investments which would otherwise be 
economically viable, and wait for a subsidy (Valletti, 2016, p. 15). 
Despite these potential problems, our cost-benefit analysis clearly suggests that state aid programs not only 
have been effective, but also efficient, as related public expenditures generated significantly higher per capita 
benefits, as measured by the additional GDP growth. This finding is based on conservative estimates and is 
further reinforced in view of other disregarded sources of major externalities of NBN, which are difficult 
to measure and/or not yet considered in the empirical literature. For instance, resilience to shocks, such as 
the one cause by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as consumer surplus related to use of digital services and 
applications. Future research should be directed to quantify the positive societal impact of NBN-specific 
services in terms of generated consumer surplus and increasing the resilience of economies to crises.  
Whereas almost all state aid programs in the past were based on supply-side stimuli, such as direct grants, 
future research should investigate the complementary role of demand-side NBN policies. In an early 
empirical analysis, Belloc et al. (2012) suggested that demand-side policies should be enhanced in the late 
phase of broadband deployment where coverage is already at high levels. This resonates well with the data 
that we present (and use for the cost-benefit analysis) in Figure 1, which shows that only some 33% of the 
available NBN connections are used by subscribers. Consumers with limited willingness to pay for more 
expensive NBN connections could, however, receive public support, for example, via vouchers or tax reliefs, 
closing the gap to the actual deployment costs of the local network operators. Demand-side policies could 
also be targeted to increase “E-literacy”, which indirectly increases the number of consumers ultimately 
adopting NBN services. Indeed, in view of still rather low NBN adoption rates, a one-sided supply funding 
focus is unlikely to be efficient in terms of realizing potential welfare gains. While still unstudied, the 




Table A.1: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variable Description Source(*) 
 Dependent variable  
FiberCov Household weighted number of “homes passed” by relevant 
FTTx technologies: Fiber to the Cabinet (FTTC) based on VDSL 
technology, Fiber to the Node (FTTN) based on DOCSIS 3.0 
technology, Fiber-to-the Building (FTTB), and Fiber to the Home 
(FTTH) technologies. In FTTH/FTTB scenarios, the final 
connection to the subscriber is optical fiber and terminates inside 
the premises, on an external wall of the subscriber’s premises, or 
no more than 2m from an external wall. “Homes passed” is the 





Main variable: State aid 
StateAid Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is a national state 
aid program implemented, supporting NBN deployment in a 
given year in the respective country. 
Own research  
(see Table A.2) 
Competition and regulation variables 
ShareDSL Absolute number of wired broadband subscribers using DSL 
technology divided by absolute number of standard analogue 
telecommunication access lines. DSL lines include bandwidth 




FixMobSub Share of the total number of mobile-cellular broadband 
subscriptions to the total number of mobile-cellular broadband 




AccessReg NBN wholesale access regulation including all remedies imposed 
on FTTx infrastructures of market-dominant operators. NBN 
access regulation is measured as a binary indicator, which is equal 
to 1 in years in which at least one of the available access remedies 
are in force in a given OECD member state (otherwise zero). 
Own research 
(Briglauer et al., 
2018)  
AccessPrice Average access price for full local loop unbundling in € which is 
calculated as the regulated monthly fee plus the regulated fixed 
connection fee distributed over three years. 
Own research 
(Briglauer et al., 
2018) 
Revenue variables 
CommExp Percentage of  total household expenditure used for ICT goods in 
the respective year. 
MarketLine 
Advantage(c) 
GDPpc Gross domestic product per capita converted to thousands of US 




AgeDepRatio Ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 65) per 





Table A.1: Variable descriptions and sources (continued) 
IntUsers Internet users are people with access to the World Wide Web 
network, measured in percentage of the population. 
ITU(f) 
TeleServP Index (2010 = 100) putting in relation the prices of  
telecommunications services in different years. 
Euromonitor(g) 
Netflix Dummy variable which takes on value 1 if  Netflix streaming 
services were available (otherwise zero). 
Own research 
Cost variables 
RuralPop Rural population measured as the percentage of the total 
population living in rural areas, calculated as difference between 






IntRate Long-term interest rates refer to government bonds maturing in 
ten years. The interest rates are generally measured as averages of  
daily rates, expressed as a percentage. 
OECD Finance 
Database(j) 
ShareApprt Total number of  households by type of  dwelling (apartment). Euromonitor(g) 
Wages Average annual wages per capita in thousands of  US dollars. Market Line 
Advantage(c) 
Instrumental variables (external instruments) 
 
GovExp Total government expenditure as percentage of  GDP.  Market Line 
Advantage(c) 
LftWng Share of the population of country i in year t voting for (rather) 
left-wing parties. 
Own research 




Hausman-type geographic instruments constructed as described 
in Section 4.2. 
Own research 
Notes: (*) All sources listed below last accessed May 25th 2021:  
(a) The FTTH Council Europe is a non-profit industry organization that provided data to FTTH Council Europe 
members in the past at: http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6  
(b) Data is publicly available at: https://data.oecd.org/broadband/fixed-broadband-subscriptions.htm#indicator-
chart 
(c) Data is commercially available at: https://advantage.marketline.com/HomePage/Index?returnUrl=Home 
(d) Data is publicly available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/gross-domestic-product-
gdp/indicator/english_dc2f7aec-en 
(e) Data is publicly available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND 
(f) Data is publicly available at: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx 
(g) Data is commercially available at: http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/portal/account/login 
(h) Data is publicly available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL 




Table A.2: Sources for national state aid programs in OECD member states 
CC* NBN state aid program name and source♣ 
AUS WIK (2009); Analysis Mason (2010); Given (2010); Beltrán (2014) 
AUT WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
CAN Analysis Mason (2010); Berkman Center (2011); Financial Post: http://business.financialpost.com/fp-
tech-desk/crtc-declares-high-speed-internet-a-basic-service-creates-750-million-fund; OECD: 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/119.nsf/eng/home 
CZE European Commission♦; European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/country-
information-czech-republic#national-and-regional-broadband-financing-instrume 
DNK European Commission♦; European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/country-
information-denmark#national-and-regional-broadband-financial-instrume  
EST WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
FIN WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
FRA WIK et al. (2020) European Commission♦ 
DEU WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
GRC WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
HUN WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
IRL WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
ITA WIK et al. (2020); European Commission: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2363_en.htm; 
European Commission♦ 
JPN WIK (2009); OECD: http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/43404360.pdf 
KOR WIK (2009); Analysis Mason (2010); Ministry of Information and Communication Republic of Korea: 
http://www.vus.sk/broadband/nbbs/kr_nbbs.pdf; ANACOM: 
https://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?categoryId=340674 
NLD WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
NZL Government of New Zealand: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ultra-fast-broadband-investment-
proposal-finalised; WIK (2009); Given (2010); Beltrán (2014); OECD: https://ufb.org.nz/nz-govt-
increases-internet-connectivity-investment-to-2b/ 
NOR Norwegian Government: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-23-2012-
2013/id718084/sec1; Store Norske Leksikon: https://snl.no/H%C3%98YKOM-programmet; 
Telecompaper.com: https://www.telecompaper.com/news/norwegian-govt-provides-nok-160-mln-in-
broadband-subsidies--1005412 
POL WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
PRT WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
SVK European Commission♦; European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/country-
information-slovakia 
SVN European Commission♦; European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/country-
information-slovenia 
ESP WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦ 
SWE  WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦; European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/country-information-sweden 
CHE Berkman Center (2011) 
GBR WIK et al. (2020); European Commission♦; WIK (2009); Digital Britain: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/22
8844/7650.pdf 
USA WIK (2009); Analysis Mason (2010); NTIA: https://www2.ntia.doc.gov/; FCC: 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/national-broadband-plan 
Notes: * Three digit-ISO 3166-1 country codes reported in column 1. For Belgium (BEL), Chile (CHL), Iceland (ISL), 
Israel (ISR), Mexico (MEX), and Turkey (TUR) to the best of our knowledge no, or only minimal (i.e., under de minimis 
rules), public subsidies have been granted for NBN deployment. In Luxemburg, we consider NBN deployment by the 
100% state owned incumbent POST Luxembourg as state aid. ♣: All links last accessed July 5th 2021. ♦: Data for all 
European Union member states were retrieved from the EC’s website 
(https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3), the Official Journal of the 
European Union and Feasey et al. (2018).   
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Table A.3: Further robustness checks 
Dep. Var.: FiberCov(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FiberCov(t-1) 0.692*** 0.677*** 0.648*** 0.676*** 0.673*** 0.677*** 0.678*** 
 (0.078) (0.083) (0.091) (0.092) (0.100) (0.087) (0.082) 
StateAid(t) 0.279** 0.357*** 0.293*** 0.382*** 0.358*** 0.353*** 0.361*** 
 (0.112) (0.088) (0.111) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) 
FixMobSub(t) 0.524*** 0.462** 0.557*** 0.484** 0.497** 0.483*** 0.491*** 
 (0.182) (0.189) (0.203) (0.199) (0.198) (0.182) (0.184) 
AgeDepRatio(t) 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
GDPpc(t) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
RuralPop(t) -2.422* -3.202** -2.158 -3.343** -3.129** -2.888** -3.163** 
 (1.466) (1.279) (1.739) (1.305) (1.345) (1.314) (1.322) 
IntRate(t) -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** -0.018** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ShareDSL(t) 0.193       
 (0.146)       
CommExp(t)  -0.030      
  (0.037)      
IntUsers(t)   0.003     
   (0.003)     
TeleServP(t)    -0.001    
    (0.001)    
Netflix(t)     0.002   
     (0.043)   
ShareApprt(t)      0.007  
      (0.015)  
Wages(t)       -0.000 
       (0.003) 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.759 0.624 0.705 0.718 0.620 0.628 0.618 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.153 0.103 0.129 0.151 0.128 0.119 0.118 
# of instruments 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
# of groups/clusters 32 32 32 30 32 32 32 
# of observations 512 512 512 480 512 512 512 
Notes: All regressions use a one-step GMM-diff. estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and extend the results from 
Table 1, column (5) by including additional explanatory variables, as listed in the table. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the group (i.e., country) level and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity.  





Table A.4: First-stage results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var.: ΔFiberCov(t-1) ΔStateAid(t) ΔFixMobSub(t) 
ΔAgeDepRatio(t) 0.008 0.003 0.010** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.004) 
ΔGDPpc(t) 0.011*** 0.000 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
ΔRuralPop(t) -1.941 0.843 -1.064 
 (2.504) (3.782) (0.763) 
ΔIntRate(t) 0.004 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) 
StateAid(t-2) 0.027 -0.097*** 0.009** 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.004) 
FixMobSub(t-2) -0.037** 0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.011) 
FiberCov(t-2) -0.005 -0.020 0.015*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.004) 
ΔStateAid31(t)  0.066 0.225 0.369*** 
 (0.123) (0.235) (0.045) 
ΔFiberCov31(t-1) 0.910*** 0.303* 0.313*** 
 (0.138) (0.161) (0.038) 
ΔLftWng(t) 0.001* -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
ΔGovExp(t) 0.007** -0.000 0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
F-test of excluded instruments (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Partial R2 of excluded instruments 0.155 0.078 0.243 
# of groups/clusters 32 32 32 
# of observations 512 512 512 
Notes: All first-stage regressions pertain to the model reported in Table 1, column (3). Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the group (i.e., country) level and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent var.: 
FiberCov* 512 0.78 0.74 0 2.86 
FiberAdop      
Main var.:      
StateAid 512 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Control vars.:      
FixMobSub 512 0.60 0.19 0.08 0.90 
ShareDSL 512 0.39 0.22 0.01 1.59 
CommExp 512 2.84 0.69 1.39 4.94 
GDPpc 512 40.00 15.67 10.87 120.98 
Netflix 512 0.37 0.48 0 1 
IntUsers 512 74.68 16.97 14.58 99.01 
TeleServP 480 98.79 16.80 48.80 258.70 
AgeDepRatio 512 50.38 5.67 36.21 68.28 
RuralPop 512 0.23 0.12 0.02 0.49 
IntRate 512 3.71 2.87 -0.49 22.50 
Wages 512 41.08 19.99 7.70 97.20 
ShareApprt 512 41.48 15.68 6.91 70.16 
AccessReg 327 0.42 0.49 0 1 
AccessPrice 204 11.30 3.92 5.34 31.30 
Instrumental vars.:      
LftWng 512 39.25 12.11 9.80 69.09 
GovExp  512 42.69 8.16 19.12 65.03 
FiberCov31 512 0.75 0.59 0.01 1.67 
StateAid31 512 0.50 0.21 0.12 0.73 
Notes: We used linear interpolation to close the gaps in our time series. Some 0.88% of the observations were 
calculated this way. Mexico and Chile also had OECD membership status during our period of analysis. However, 
they were excluded because of the missing information on the external instruments. Missing values are not related in 





Table 2: Main estimation results 
Dep. Var.: FiberCov(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FiberCov(t-1) 0.440*** 0.562*** 0.508*** 0.628*** 0.676*** 
 (0.112) (0.096) (0.137) (0.097) (0.084) 
StateAid(t) 0.220*** 0.279*** 0.345*** 0.249*** 0.356*** 
 (0.084) (0.077) (0.108) (0.060) (0.087) 
FixMobSub(t) 0.903*** 0.574** 0.611 0.717*** 0.496*** 
 (0.310) (0.238) (0.397) (0.224) (0.187) 
AgeDepRatio(t) 0.019* 0.012* 0.015* 0.007 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
GDPpc(t) 0.010* 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
RuralPop(t) -5.141*** -4.376*** -4.682*** -3.325*** -3.110** 
 (1.238) (1.200) (1.416) (1.268) (1.326) 
IntRate(t) -0.015** -0.015** -0.016** -0.020** -0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
F-test (2SLS)/χ2 (GMM) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.802 0.727 0.668 0.729 0.625 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.110 0.426 0.340 0.767 0.115 
# of instruments 18 15 11 42 26 
# of groups/clusters 32 32 32 32 32 
# of observations 480 512 512 480 512 
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) are based on a 2SLS estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), which uses various IV-
style internal and external instruments that differ only in the lag structure. Columns (4) and (5) are based on a one-step 
GMM-diff. estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), which additionally uses GMM-style instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group (i.e., country) level and robust to arbitrary 
forms of heteroscedasticity.  





Table 3: Tests and robustness checks 
Dep. Var.: FiberCov(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FiberCov(t-1) 0.687*** 0.690*** 0.605** 0.582*** 0.287 
 (0.136) (0.110) (0.257) (0.141) (0.254) 
StateAid(t) 0.279** 0.239** 0.374*** 0.209* 0.347** 
 (0.137) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.152) 
FixMobSub(t) 0.354** 0.341** 0.537** 0.643** 0.989** 
 (0.151) (0.148) (0.261) (0.269) (0.482) 
AgeDepRatio(t) 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.011 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.017) 
GDPpc(t) -0.000 0.001 0.005 0.016** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
RuralPop(t) -2.961* -2.561* -3.337** -4.566*** -7.081*** 
 (1.709) (1.476) (1.559) (1.351) (2.187) 
IntRate(t) -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** -0.021* -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
TimeTrend(t) 0.009 0.018    
 (0.021) (0.016)    
TimeTrend2(t)  -0.001    
  (0.000)    
FiberCov(t-1) * StateAid(t)   0.059   
   (0.228)   
AccessReg(t)    0.019  
    (0.077)  
AccessPrice(t)     -0.004 
     (0.004) 
χ2-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.692 0.818 0.510 0.185 0.142 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.109 0.777 0.129 0.374 0.284 
# of instruments 27 28 27 27 19 
# of groups/clusters 32 32 32 27 21 
# of observations 512 512 512 327 204 
Notes: All regressions use a one-step GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and extend the results from 
table 1, column (5) by including additional explanatory variables, as listed in the table. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the group (i.e., country) level and robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity.  




Table 4: State aid expenditures on NBN 
Country State aid per 
capita (US$) 
Period # of years State aid per 
capita per year 
(US$) 
Australia 1,721 2003-2019 17 101.24 
Austria 125.5 2003-2018 16 7.84 
Belgium n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Canada 41.4 
2002-2019 (except 2013-
2015) 15 2.76 
Czech Rep 1.2 2003-2018 16 0.08 
Denmark 8.4 2014-2019 6 1.41 
Finland 30.3 2003-2018 16 1.89 
France 214.8 2003-2018 16 13.43 
Germany 87.3 2003-2018 16 5.46 
Greece 44.2 2003-2018 16 2.76 
Hungary n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Iceland n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ireland 40.2 2003-2018 16 2.51 
Italy 145.4 2003-2018 16 9.09 
Japan 11.6 2006-2010 5 2.33 
Korea 362.0 2002-2012 11 32.91 
Luxemburg n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands 1.5 2003-2018 16 0.09 
New Zealand 270.0 2009-2019 11 24.55 
Norway 60.5 2002-2014 13 4.65 
Poland 17.7 2003-2018 16 1.11 
Portugal 10.1 2003-2018 16 0.63 
Slovak Rep 21.0 2003-2018 16 1.31 
Spain 34.3 2003-2018 16 2.14 
Sweden 7.0 2003-2018 16 0.44 
Switzerland 4.3 2007-2019 13 0.33 
Turkey n/a n/a n/a n/a 
UK 59.5 2003-2018 16 3.72 
USA 129.9 2009-2019 11 11.81 
Estonia 16.8 2003-2018 16 1.05 
Israel n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia 75.5 2009-2019 11 6.86 
Average 136.21   14.2 9.32 
Sources: own calculations based on Feasey et al. (2018) and sources cited in table A.2 
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